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POST EMPLOYMENT RESTRAINTS: AN
ANALYSIS OF THEORIES OF
ENFORCEMENT, AND A SUGGESTED
SUPPLEMENT TO THE COVENANT
NOT TO COMPETE
I. INTRODUCTION
The free market has long been recognized as the foundation of our
economic system. It is axiomatic that a free market system functions
most efficiently in an environment of freedom of choice and of con-
tract, of freely flowing commerce, and of unbridled competition. At
early common law, covenants not to compete in employment agree-
ments' were viewed by the courts as a restraint of trade and invalid.2
Undeniably, however, the knowledge, business contacts, and expertise
gained by key employees during their employment placed the employ-
ees in a unique position upon leaving an employer's service. If they
used this acquired knowledge, the individuals or a new employer
1. This article is concerned exclusively with covenants which are ancillary to employment
contracts. No treatment is accorded to promises not to compete that are ancillary to pension or
profit-sharing plans; nor does this article address the competition restraints imposed in the sale of
a business. The differences in purpose and the considerations involved in the latter are considered
in Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 647 (1960). As explained
by Professor Blake, the objective of the post-employment restraint is "not to prevent the competi-
tive use of the unique personal qualities of the employees-either during or after the employ-
ment-but to prevent competitive use, for a time, of information or relationships which pertain
peculiarly to the employer and which the employee acquired in the course of the employment."
Id.
2. The Dyer's Case, 2 Hen. V.P. 26 (1414); Carpenter, Validity of Contracts Not To Compete,
76 U. PA. L. REv. 244, 244-45 (1928).
Not only did the early cases attach no importance to the narrowness or the generality of
the restriction, but they made no distinctions as to whether the contract was a bare one
not to compete, or was made as part of a contract for a term of employment, or as
ancillary to the sale of a business. The reasons for holding contracts not to engage in a
trade or employment void were not stated in the early cases, but the objections to such
covenants are not difficult to surmise when it is remembered that at that time there were
few trades a man could follow without having been duly apprenticed. . . . Under these
conditions it is apparent that an agreement not to carry on a trade or to refrain from
competing with the covenantee might have greatly injured the covenantor by divesting
him of his only means of earning a livelihood. ...
Id See Kreider, Trends In The Enforcement Of Restrictive Covenants, 35 U. ClN. L. REv. 16, 16
(1966). See generally RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 515-16, 518 (1932); 6 A. CORBIN, CON-
TRAcTs §§ 1379-96 (1962); S. WILLISTON & G. THOMPSON, CoNTPAcTs §§ 1628-1664A (rev. ed.
1936).
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would gain an unfair competitive edge over the former employer.3
Consequently, the courts came to tolerate the use of covenants not to
compete as instruments to protect former employers.4 But even today,
this tolerance is not unlimited.
The courts' recognition that employers had legitimate concerns
and interests worthy of protection instigated enforcement of reasonable
covenants by injunction following a breach.' The extent of enforce-
ment is confined to that which is reasonable under the circumstances. 6
Courts have determined that a covenant which offends the rule of rea-
son does not result in total denial of enforcement.7 Accordingly, this
comment will discuss approaches taken by the courts when faced with
an unreasonable covenant in the employment agreement.
This article analyzes approaches taken by courts in all fifty states
toward an unreasonable covenant not to compete. There are four basic
approaches to overly broad restrictive covenants:
1. Deny enforcement of the entire covenant;
2. The blue pencil approach in which a court will grant en-
forcement of the covenant if it can blue pencil or strike out
objectionable language without changing the impact of the
clause;
3. Reform an overly broad restraint without regard to the
severability of contract language; and
3. Kreider, supra note 2, at 16-17.
4. See, eg., Dowden v. Pook, [1904] 1 K.B. 54; Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt, etc. Co.,
[1894] A.C. 535; Chesman v. Nainby, 93 Eng. Rep. 819 (K.B. 1726).
5. See, ag., Smithereen Co. v. Renfroe, 325 Ili. App. 229, -, 59 N.E.2d 545, 548-49 (1945)(injunctive relief will be granted where the employer proves that nonenforcement of the covenant
will result in irreparable harm to or substantial interference with his business).
6. Some courts determine the validity of such covenants by applying what is known as the
"rule of reason" test, which requires a covenant to be reasonable in order to be valid. See, e.g.,
Josten's, Inc. v. Cuquet, 383 F. Supp. 295, 297 (E.D. Mo. 1974); Technicolor, Inc. v. Traeger, 57
Hawaii 113, -, 551 P.2d 163, 170 (1976). See also Note, Partial Enforcement OfPost-Employment
Restrictive Covenants, 15 COLUM. J.L. Soc. PROBS. 181, 182-88 (1979).
7. Under the rule of reason, an employee's restrictive covenant is unenforceable as against
public policy if it constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade. To be held reasonable, the cove-
nant must satisfy the following requirements: (1) The agreement must be necessary for the pro-
tection of the employer, (2) it must provide a reasonable time period; (3) it must cover a
reasonable territory; (4) it must not be unreasonable as to the employee; and (5) it must not be
unreasonable as to the general public. Richards, Drafting andEnforcing Restrictive Covenants Not
To Compete, 55 MARQ. L. REv. 241,242 (1972) (citing Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 8 Wis. 2d 157,
98 N.W.2d 415 (1959)).
For an interesting analysis of this issue, see Judge Hoover's metaphorical treatment of the
issue in Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 105
N.E.2d 685 (C.P. 1952). "In determining what is reasonable the Goddess of Justice that hovers
over the American court house with scale in hand has a delicate job of weighing; and it is a
three-not a two-pan scale for she must balance the conflicting interests of employer, employee
and public." Id. at -, 105 N.E.2d at 692.
[Vol. 17:155
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4. Regulation by statute.
This annotation will classify each state under one of the above catego-
ries. This comment is intended to be used as a tool by the practitioner,
providing him or her with a convenient reference to state statutes, case
law, or in-depth articles dealing with covenants not to compete in all
fifty states. Also discussed is the possibility of protecting an employer's
business interest by supplementing the covenant with a confidentiality
or secrecy agreement.
II. THE FOUR APPROACHES TO OVEI.Y BROAD RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS
A. Unreasonable Restriction May Not Be Modified and Enforced
Where the restrictive covenant is unreasonable in time, area, or
both, some states have adopted the rule that the restrictive covenant
"must be judged as a whole and must stand or fall when so judged."9
Under this rule, the restrictions are not divisible by the courts.
Whether part of the contract might be deemed reasonable and
enforceable is not the question. It comes to us as a single doc-
ument, We must construe it as the parties made it. "The
Court cannot by splitting up the territory make a new contract
for the parties. It must stand or fall integrally."' 0
The Arkansas case of Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman t pro-
vides a forthright example of this approach. Vroman, the employee-
salesman, agreed not to compete with Rector-Phillips-Morse within a
single county for three years after termination of his employment. The
Arkansas Supreme Court held that the three-year period was too long
and refused even partial enforcement, despite the following provision
in Vroman's employment agreement:
It is the intent of the parties to restrict the activities of
Vroman only to the extent necessary for the protection of le-
gitimate business interests of RPM and they specifically cove-
nant and agree that the above provisions, under any set of
circumstances not now foreseen by the parties, be deemed too
-broad for that purpose that such provisions will, nevertheless,
be valid and enforceable to the extent necessary for such
8. Blake, supra note 1, at 629-83.
9. Welcome Wagon, Inc. v. Morris, 224 F.2d 693, 701 (4th Cir. 1955).
10. Henley Paper Co. v. McAllister, 253 N.C. 529, 535, 117 S.E.2d 431, 434-35 (1960). See
also Welcome Wagon, Inc. v. Morris, 224 F.2d 693, 701 (4th Cir. 1955).
11. 253 Ark. 750, 489 S.W.2d 1 (1973).
1981]
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The court explained that partial enforcement amounted to a judicial
rewrite of the contract and tended to provoke unnecessary litigation.
Therefore, the court held that the covenant would not be enforced.' 3
Georgia is another state which refuses to grant partial enforcement
of unreasonable restrictive covenants.' 4 In Richard P. Rita Personnel
Services International, Inc. v. Kot,'1 the franchisee agreed to a covenant
restricting him from competing against the franchisor in Fulton, Cobb,
and DeKalb counties, or any territorial areas where the franchisor had
granted franchises.' 6  Upon the franchisee's breach, the franchisor
sought to enforce only that part of the covenant applicable to the three
Georgia counties, and requested that the court adopt the "blue pencil"
theory, deleting the unenforceable portion of the covenant.'7 After ex-
amining cases rejecting partial enforcement,' the court refused to sever
the unreasonable language and held that the coi'enant in its entirety
was unenforceable. 19
Even though it appears that rejection of the entire covenant is
followed in only a few states, principally Arizona, 20  Arkansas, 21
Georgia,22  Maine,23  Nebraska,24  South Carolina,25  Tennessee,26
12. Id at 753, 489 S.W.2d at 3-4.
13. Id at 755, 489 S.W.2d at 5. For a detailed examination of the position taken by the
Arkansas courts when faced with an unreasonable covenant, see Orkin Exterminating v. Weaver,
257 Ark. 926,-, 521 S.W.2d 69, 71-72 (1975), and Note, Employee Covenants Not To Compete, 29
ARK. L. REV. 406, 413 (1975).
14. See Morris,: ASurvey Of Covenants Not To Compete Ancillary To Employment Contracts
In Georgia, 10 GA. STA. B.J. 125, 125 (1973).
15. 229 Ga. 314, 191 S.E.2d 79 (1972).
16. Id at -, 191 S.E.2d at 80.
17. Id See Morris, supra note 14, at 136.
18. Eg., WAKE Broadcasters v. Crawford, 215 Ga. 862, -, 114 S.E.2d 26, 28 (1960).
19. 229 Ga. at -, 191 S.E.2d at 81. One commentator believes that the Rita decision is
illustrative of a clear trend among Georgia courts to refuse to apply any theory of partial enforce-
ment. Morris, supra note 14, at 137. See Labor Pool of Atlanta, Inc. v. Alps, Inc., 227 Ga. 463,-,
181 S.E.2d 385, 385 (1971).
20. See Lassen v. Benton, 87 Ariz. 72, 347 P.2d 1012 (1959). Reluctant to rewrite the contract
for the parties, the court upheld the entire covenant on the grounds that it was indivisible. Id at
-, 347 P.2d at 1013. It is not clear whether the court, had it found the agreement to be divisible,
would have applied its blue pencil and enforced only part of the agreement.
21. Orkin Exterminating v. Weaver, 257 Ark. 926, -, 521 S.W.2d 69, 71-72 (1975); Rector-
Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 253 Ark. 750, -, 489 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1973). See notes 11-13 supra
and accompanying text.
22. Richard P. Rita Personnel Servs. Int'l, Inc. v. Kot, 229 Ga. 314, -, 191 S.E.2d 79, 81
(1972); Labor Pool of Atlanta, Inc. v. Alps, Inc., 227 Ga. 463, 463, 181 S.E.2d 385, 385 (1971). See
notes 14-19 supra and accompanying text.
23. See Roy v. Bolduc, 140 Me. 103, -, 34 A.2d 479, 480-81 (1953).
24. See Midlands Transp. Co. v. Apple Lines, Inc., 188 Neb. 435, -, 197 N.W.2d 646, 651
(1972); Adams v. Adams, 156 Neb. 778, 58 N.W.2d 172 (1953). Although not faced with an unrea-
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Virginia27 and Wisconsin, 8 this minority view marshalls some persua-
sive policy arguments. For example, some courts argue that to allow
modification of unreasonable covenants would encourage employers to
draft broad non-competition agreements, knowing that most employees
respect them as written. The proportionately few breached covenants
would find their way into court, to "be pared down and enforced when
the facts of a particular case are not unreasonable."2 9 Typically, these
courts will not modify and enforce unreasonable restraints on the
ground that a court may not rewrite the parties' contract because to do
so is "not within the judicial province as it has been traditionally un-
derstood in our law."3 Still other courts refuse to enforce unreasona-
sonable covenant in Adams, the language of the opinion indicates the court's tendency to uphold
or deny enforcement of a covenant as written. "[A]n agreement which limits the right of a person
to engage in a business or occupation will be strictly construed and will not be extended by implica-
tion or construction beyond thefair or natural import of the language used." Id at--, 58 N.W.2d at
179 (emphasis added).
25. Eastern Business Forms, Inc. v. Kistler, 258 S.C. 429, 189 S.E.2d 22 (1972). The follow-
ing excerpt from Kistler is indicative of the South Carolina Supreme Court's response to partial
enforcement of covenants not to compete:
The contract shows upon its face that it was the intent of the parties thereto that this
covenant be treated as indivisible. It follows, that there is no basis for drawing a sharply
defined line separating the excess territory. We cannot make a new agreement for the
parties into which they did not voluntarily enter. We must uphold the covenant as writ-
ten or not at all, it must stand or fall integrally. The invalidity of the covenant is not
aided by the respondent's willingness to accept a restriction that is proper in scope.
Id at 434, 189 S.E.2d at 24. (But see Annot., 61 A.L.R. 3d 397, 412 (1975), for the proposition that
Kistler approves of the use of the "blue pencil" theory.) For a thorough examination of South
Carolina's reaction to unreasonable restraints, see Comment- The Status Of The Blue Pencil Rule
AIs Applied In South Carolina To Covenants Not To Compete, 28 S.C.L. Rnv. 726, 729-38 (1977).
26. Tennessee's refusal to follow the blue pencil theory or to allow the recent approach of
partial enforcement is illustrated in Allright Auto Parks, Inc. v. Berry, 219 Tenn. 280, 409 S.W.2d
361 (1966). The Berry decision is discussed in Note, Trade Regulation--Covenants Not To Com-
pete, 34 TENN. L. REV. 717, 721 (1967).
27. Richardson v. Paxton Co., 203 Va. 790, -, 127 S.E.2d 113, 117 (1962). For a detailed
explanation of Virginia's approach to unreasonable restraints, see Note, Employee Covenants Not
To Compete: Where Does Virginia Stand?, 15 U. RiCH. L. REv. 105, 142-44 (1980).
28. The Wisconsin approach is dictated by statute:
A covenant by an assistant, servant or agent not to compete with his employer or princi-
pal during the term of the employment or agency, or thereafter, within a specified terri-
tory and during a specified time is lawful and enforceable only if the restrictions imposed
are reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer or principal. Any such re-
strictive covenant imposing an unreasonable restraint is illegal, void and unenforceable
even as to so much of the covenant or performance of the covenant or performance as
would be a reasonable restraint.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (West 1977). For a helpful explanation of the Wisconsin approach,
see Richards, supra note 7. See also notes 103-06 infra and accompanying text.
29. Richard P. Rita Personnel Servs. Int'l, Inc. v. Kot, 229 Ga. 314, -, 191 S.E.2d 79, 81
(1972).
30. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 253 Ark. 750, 753, 489 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1973). Blake
argues that a court's willingness to modify the proportionately few covenants which come to trial
"smacks of having one's employee's cake, and eating it too." Blake, supra note 1, at 683.
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ble restraints under the aegis of a state restraint of trade statute
prohibiting such covenants.3a
B. The Blue Pencil Approach
32
The frequently cited case of Mitchell v. Reynolds33 was among the
first decisions to recognize the validity of limited noncompetition stric-
tures. A prerequisite for enforceability was that the covenant could re-
strain the employee no more than necessary to protect the employer.
Following Mitchell, the English courts were forced to confront the.
problem of an unreasonable geographical restriction where the circum-
stances clearly merited a lesser restraint.34 Since courts traditionally
had refrained from rewriting or revising contracts, they were anxious
to find another solution.3 - An acceptable alternative was created in
Chesman v. Nainby.36 By contract, the former employee was not to
compete in an area one-half mile around the employer's shop or any
other shop in which the employer might relocate. Using what has since
come to be known as the "blue pencil" approach,37 the court upheld the
specific restraint and invalidated the general restraint.38
- As explained by Professor Corbin, the blue pencil rule determines
the divisibility of a covenant that excessively restrains trade by purely
mechanical means:
[If the promise is so worded that the excessive restraint can
be eliminated by crossing out a few of the words with a "blue
pencil" while at the same time the remaining words constitute
a complete and valid contract, the contract as thus "blue pen-
cilled" will be enforced. By some occult process, the courts
adopting this rule convinced themselves that partial enforce-
ment without the aid of a "blue pencil" would be "making a
new contract for the parties" while partial enforcement in the
31. See notes 93-107 infra and accompanying text.
32. This theory has also been referred to as "the doctrine of partial validity," in Extine v.
Williamson Midwest, Inc., 176 Ohio St. 403, -, 200 N.E.2d 297, 299 (1964), "the rule of...
selective construction," in Solari Indus., Inc. v. Malady, 55 N.J. 571, -, 264 A.2d 53, 60 (1970),
and the "blue pencil theory of severability," in Richard P. Rita Personnel Servs. Int'l, Inc. v. Kot,
229 Ga. 314, -, 191 S.E.2d 79, 81 (1972).
33. 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Ch. 1711).
34. See, eg., Dowden v. Pook, [1904] 1 K.B. 54; Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt, etc. Co.,
[1894] A.C. 535.
35. Note, Ohio Puts Away Its Blue Pencil, 5 CAP. U.L. REv. 99, 100 (1976).
36. 93 Eng. Rep. 819 (K.B. 1726).
37. This term originated from the traditional use of a blue lead pencil by the courts when
evaluating such a covenant in a contract. 6 A. CoRDiN, CoNTRACTs § 1390, at 67 (1962).
38. 93 Eng. Rep. at 821.
[Vol. 17:155
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wake of a "blue pencil" is not.39
Thus, where a covenant imposes a limit upon an unreasonable extent of
territory, the court may, in its discretion, enforce the covenant only to a
reasonable extent.'n
The blue pencil approach to unreasonable covenants not to com-
pete is perhaps best illustrated by a thorough examination of the court's
treatment of the covenant in Extine v. Williamson Midwest, Inc. 4 1 In
Extine, the employment agreement contained the following restraint:
In consideration of his employment by Employer, Employee
agrees that on the termination for any cause whatsoever of his
said employment, he will not, within two years after such ter-
mination, directly or indirectly, engage in the same or similar
or competitive line of business to that now carried on by Em-
ployer, either on his own account or through or for or in be-
alf of any former employee of Employer and that he will
not, within said period of employment and two years thereaf-
ter, in any way, directly or indirectly, divert or attempt to di-
vert from Employer any business whatsoever and particularly
not by influencing or attempting to influence any of the cus-
tomers with whom he may have had dealings.4
In light of the facts of the case, the Supreme Court of Ohio recog-
nized that some restraint on the former employee was warranted, but
39. 6 A. ConIN, CoNTRACTs § 1390, at 67 (1962). The American Law Institute emphasizes
the form of the covenant
Where a promise in reasonable restraint of trade in a bargain has added to it a promise
in unreasonable restraint, the former promise is enforceable unless the entire agreement
is part of a plan to obtain a monopoly; but if full performance of a promise indivisible in
terms would involve unreasonable restraint the promise is illegal and is not enforceable
even for so much of the performance as would be a reasonable restraint.
RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcTs § 518 (1932).
40. This concept of blue pencilling, or crossing out the unreasonable portions of the covenant
without impairing the meaning of the contract, is illustrated in the following example.
A contract stating that X, now working for a Cincinnati clothier, could not thereafter for
three years sell clothing in Cincinnati, m Ohio, or in the United States, could be enforced
in Cincinnati by blue penciling or crossing out, "in Ohio, or in the United States," which
would appear to be unreasonable under the circumstances, thus leaving the literal word-
ing of the contract including only "Cincinnati."
Kreider, supra note 2, at 24-25. One court has deemed the ability to sever and enforce contract
terms as part of "[tihe unique virtue of equity [which] sometimes straightens out morally damaged
frames as well as rehabilitates legally wrecked principles." Barb-Lee Mobile Frame Co. v. Hoot,
416 Pa. 222, 224, 206 A.2d 59, 60 (1965).
41. 176 Ohio St. 403,200 N.E.2d 297 (1964), overruled, Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St.
2d 21, 325 N.E.2d 544 (1975). For an in-depth discussion of the Extine decision, see Kreider,
supra note 2, at 27-30. Since Raimonde, Ohio courts will now determine a reasonable restriction
and, if necessary, rewrite the parties' contract See Keller v. Graphic Systems of Akron, Inc., 422
F. Supp. 1005, 1013 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Note, supra note 35, at 403-04.
42. 176 Ohio St. at 403-04, 200 N.E.2d at 298.
7
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held that the above clause, in its entirety, surpassed reasonable limits. 43
The court determined the covenant met the blue pencil, or partial
validity, test, and that it was divisible into restraints which kept the
former employee from participating in four different activities for two
years after termination of employment. The covenant as written pro-
vided that the former employee: (1) would not engage in the same or
similar competitive line of business on his own account; (2) would not
engage in a competitive line of business on behalf of any former em-
ployee of the employer; (3) would not divert or attempt to divert busi-
ness from the employer; and (4) would not attempt to divert business
from the employer by influencing or attempting to influence customers
with whom the former employee may have been dealing.'
The court concluded that restraints (1) and (2) were not limited
geographically. Those restraints, if enforced, would apply to areas
where the employer neither conducted present business nor planned
future activity. Consequently, the court found restraints (1) and (2)
were unreasonable, and, using its blue pencil, severed them from the
agreement. However, the court held that restraints (3) and (4) were
designed to protect "the employer in its own legitimate occupation and
enterprise, and, therefore, are valid and enforceable." 4
States such as Connecticut,46 nlinois,47 Indiana, 48 New York,49
North Carolina, 0 Pennsylvania,5 ' Rhode Island, 2 and West
43. Id at 407, 200 N.E.2d at 300.
44. Id at 406-07, 200 N.E.2d at 299.
45. Id at 406-07, 200 N.E.2d at 300.
46. See Timenterial, Inc. v. Dagata, 29 Conn. Supp. 180, -,277 A.2d 512, 515 (1971) (cove-
nant unenforceable because it was indivisible).
47. Central Keystone Plating, Inc. v. Hutchison, 62 11. App. 2d 188,-, 210 N.E.2d 239, 242-
43 (1965) (covenant found divisible; case remanded with instructions to determine reasonable
area). See Note, Validity of Covenants Not To Compete: Common Law Rules And llinos Law,
1978 U. ILL. L.F. 249, 255-61.
48. See Donahue v. Permacel Tape Corp., 234 Ind. 398,-, 127 N.E.2d 235, 241 (1955) (cov-
enant unenforceable because restricted area, the United States and Canada, described in covenant
as one indivisible whole).
49. Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 28 N.Y.2d 45, 52, 268 N.E.2d 751, 755, 320 N.Y.S.2d 1, 7 (1971);
Note, Remedies--Covenant Not to Compete Between Professionals-Severance and Enforcement of
Only that Portion of Covenant Mhich is Reasonable in Scope, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 430, 432
(1971).
50. Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender, 255 N.C. 244, 248, 120 S.E.2d 739, 742 (1961);
Constangy, Employment Contract Covenants Not to Compete: Enforceability Under North Carolina
Law, 10 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 217,234-235 (1974). See Note, Restraints on Trade--Covenants in
Employment Contracts not to Compete within the Entire United States, 49 N.C.L. REv. 393, 401
(1971).
51. Reading Aviation Serv. v. Bertolet, 454 Pa. 488, -, 311 A.2d 628, 630 (1973); accord,
Barb-Lee Mobile Frame Co. v. Hoot, 416 Pa. 222, -, 206 A.2d 59, 61 (1965). Pennsylvania's
[Vol. 17:155
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Virginia,53 continue to apply the blue pencil test to unreasonable cove-
nants. But as seen in the following sections, the law is still developing
on the issue of making a covenant not to compete reasonable by rewrit-
ing it.
C. Partial Enforcement Without Regard to Severability of Terms 54
It is argued that a theory of reasonable enforcement is more con-
sistent with the inherent concerns of equity-fairness and reasonable-
ness-than the mechanical blue pencil test, which is said to emphasize
form over substance and result in arbitrariness and inconsistency.55
This modern approach contends that equity should not permit the in-
justice which might result from rejecting the covenant merely because
the court disagrees with an employer over the restrictions necessary to
protect the employer's business.56
Many of the more recent cases indicate a trend toward enforcing
indivisible covenants to a reasonable and lawful extent.57 Wood v.
application of the blue pencil rule is discussed at length in Comment, Enforcement OfRestrictive
Covenants In Pennsylvania Employment Contracts, 80 DicK. L. Rav. 693, 708-10 (1976).
52. Max Garelick, Inc. v. Leonardo, 105 RI. 142, -, 250 A.2d 354, 357 (1969).
53. See 0. Hommel Co. v. Fink, 115 W. Va. 686, -, 177 S.E. 619, 621 (1934) (partial en-
forcement of covenant's terms; court did not couch its decision in terms of blue pencil approach).
Later West Virginia courts speak of "shaving" the contract's terms. See, e.g., Pancake Realty Co.
v. Harber, 137 W. Va. 605, -, 73 S.E.2d 438, 442 (1952) (partial enforcement of covenant denied
as court refused to reduce or "shave" terms of agreement without express territorial limitation).
54. This approach or theory of enforcement of unreasonable covenants is hereinafter referred
to as "reasonable enforcement."
55. See, ag., Insurance Center, Inc. v. Taylor, 94 Idaho 896, -, 499 P.2d 1252, 1255 (1972);
Bess v. Bothman, - Minn. -, 257 N.W.2d 791, 794-95 (1977). The reasonable enforcement ap-
proach rejects a dependence on form where differences in wording of substantively identical
agreements would result in the partial enforcement of one restraint but in complete invalidity of
the other. Comment, The Status ofthe Blue Pencil Rule as Applied in South Carolina to Covenants
not to Compete, 28 S.C.L. REv. 726, 728 (1977). This dichotomy is illustrated in the following
sample covenant based on an example found in Kreider, supra note 2, at 24-25: Employee agrees
not to engage in competition with Employer in the clothing business with the State of X. Even
though State X is composed of several cities and counties, the blue pencil theory would find the
terms grammatically unseverable. The covenant would be totally void. In contrast, the reason-
able enforcement theory would not even consider divisibility and would simply enforce the cove-
nant to a reasonable extent. The latter approach might limit the restraint to City Y or County Z.
56. Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 45 Ohio St. 2d 21, 325 N.E.2d 544 (1975). The Raimonde court
pointed out that blue penciling can eviscerate a contract: "Because employers seek to ensure that
provisions are not unreasonable, and therefore severed, employees may gain the benefit of overly-
lenient employment restrictions." Id at -, 325 N.E.2d at 546.
57. E.g., American Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales Co. v. Rodriguez, 480 F.2d 223, 227-29 (1st
Cir. 1973); Mason Corp. v. Kennedy, 286 Ala. 639, -, 244 So. 2d 585, 590 (1971); Technicolor,
Inc. v. Traeger, 57 Hawaii 113, -, 551 P.2d 163, 170 (1976); Insurance Center, Inc. v. Taylor, 94
Idaho 896,-, 499 P.2d 1252, 1254-55 (1972); Ehlers v. Iowa Warehouse Co., 188 N.W.2d 368, 370
(Iowa 1971), modfedon other grounds, 190 N.W.2d 413 (Iowa 1971); Foltz v. Struxness, 168 Kan.
714,-, 215 P.2d 133, 137-38 (1950); Redd Pest Control Co. v. Heatherly, 248 Miss. 34,-, 157 So.
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May58 illustrates this tack. In Wood, the employer, in accordance with
the employment agreement, sought to prevent his former employee
from competing with him within specified temporal and geographical
limits.5 9 The trial court found that the area encompassed by the restric-
tion was excessive and therefore unreasonable. In refusing to modify
the covenant, it held that the unreasonable restraint was not severable,
and that the entire covenant was thus unenforceable. On appeal, the
Washington Supreme Court agreed with the finding of unreasonable-
ness, but rejected the mechanistic blue pencil test. The case was re-
manded with instructions to enforce time and area restrictions that
were reasonable under the circumstances. 60
The Redd Pest Control Co. v. Heather, ' decision is another ex-
ample of a court's application of the reasonableness test. In Heatherly,
the restrictive covenant prohibited the former employee from working
in the exterminating business anywhere in the state. The court modi-
fied the covenant, enjoining the former employee from competing with
his former employer within a fifty-mile radius of Tupelo. The territory
was determined to be that in which he could use contacts established in
his former job to take away his former employer's customers. The
court explained that "the legality of contracts in restraint of trade
should not turn upon the mere form of wording but rather upon the
reasonableness of giving effect to the indivisible promise to the extent
that it would be lawful."62
As discussed above, a number of recent cases evidence a new di-
rection in enforcing unreasonable covenants.6" It appears the following
2d 133, 135-36 (1963); Solari Indus., Inc. v. Malady, 55 N.J. 571, -, 264 A.2d 53, 61 (1970);
Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 45 Ohio St. 2d 21, -, 325 N.E.2d 544, 547 (1975) (specifically overrul-
ing Extine v. Williamson Midwest, Inc., 176 Ohio St. 403, 200 N.E.2d 297 (1964), and abandoning
the blue pencil test); Justin Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681, 685-86 (Tex. 1973); Wood v. May, 73
Wash. 2d 307, -, 438 P.2d 587, 590-91 (1968).
58. 73 Wash. 2d 307, 438 P.2d 587 (1968).
59. The employer relied on the following clause in the employment agreement:
[F]or a period of five years from and after the time he shall leave the . . . employer
[Wood], either if by resignation or by discharge, that he shall not engage directly or
indirectly in any business or enterprise the nature of which is competitive to the very
employers [sic] business, that is to say he shall not engage in the practice of Horseshoeing
or Blacksmithing, within a radius of one hundred miles [from the employer's principal
place of business].
Id at 308, 438 P.2d at 588.
60. Wood is discussed at length in 45 WASH. L. REv. 210 (1970).
61. 248 Miss. 34, 157 So. 2d 133 (1963).
62. Id at -, 157 So. 2d at 136. This case receives thorough treatment in Note, Employee
Covenants Not To Compete: Where Does Virginia Stand?, 15 U. RiCm. L. Rav. 105, 140 (1980).
63. Note 57 supra and accompanying text.
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jurisdictions will enforce indivisible covenants to a lawful and reason-
able extent: Alabama," Alaska,65  Colorado,66  Delaware,6 7
Florida, 68  Hawaii,69  Idaho,7 0  Iowa,7 1 Kansas,
72  Kentucky,73
Maryland, 74 Massachusetts,75 Minnesota, 76 Mississippi,7 7 Missouri,78
New Hampshire, 7 9 New Mexico, 0 New Jersey,
81 Nevada,82 Ohio,83
Oregon, 84 Puerto Rico,85 Texas, 86 Utah,8
7 Vermont,88 Washington,89
64. Mason Corp. v. Kennedy, 286 Ala. 639, -, 244 So. 2d 585, 590 (1971).
65. See generaly National Bank of Alaska v. J.B.L. & K. of Alaska, Inc., 546 P.2d 579
(Alaska 1976) (semble).
66. Gulick v. A. Robert Strawn & Assocs., Inc., 477 P.2d 489, 493 (Colo. App. 1970). See
generally Krendl & Krendl, Noncompetition Covenants In Colorado: 4 Statutory Solution?, 52
DEN. L.J. 488 (1975).
67. Turek v. Tull, 37 DeL Ch. 190,-, 139 A.2d 368, 373-74, aft'd, 38 DeL Ch. 182, 147 A.2d
658 (1958).
68. Kofoed Pub. Relations Assocs. v. Mullins, 257 So. 2d 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). The
court explained that it would impose "too high a duty of foresight on contracting parties" if a
covenant was entirely unenforceable because the parties failed to define a reasonable area. Id at
605. See American Bldg. Maintenance Co. v. Fogelman, 167 So. 2d 791, 792 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1964); 19 U. MLAMI L. REv. 318 (1964).
69. Technicolor, Inc. v. Traeger, 57 Hawaii 113, -, 551 P.2d 163, 170 (1976).
70. Insurance Center, Inc. v. Taylor, 94 Idaho 896, -, 499 P.2d 1252, 1255 (1972).
71. Ehlers v. Iowa Warehouse Co., 188 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Iowa 1971), modo/ed on other
grounds, 190 N.W.2d 413 (Iowa 1971).
72. Foltz v. Struxness, 168 Kan. 714, -, 215 P.2d 133, 137 (1950).
73. See Ceresia v. Mitchell, 242 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Ky. 1951) (dictum indicates the court will
enforce unreasonable restraints to a reasonable extent where to do so would not deleteriously
affect the parties and the public).
74. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co. v. Dresser, 269 Md. App. 364,-, 306 A.2d 213,217
(1973). See Millward v. Gerstung Int'l Sport Educ., Inc., 268 Md. 483,-, 302 A.2d 14, 17 (1973);
34 MD. L. REv. 169 (1974).
75. See All Stainless, Inc. v. Colby, 364 Mass. 773, -, 308 N.E.2d 481, 485 (1974);
Metropolitan Ice Co. v. Ducas, 291 Mass. 403,-, 196 N.E. 856, 858 (1935); Whiting Milk Cos. v.
O'Connell, 277 Mass. 570, -, 179 N.E. 169, 170 (1931). These decisions reject the blue pencil
approach the court used in Edgecomb v. Edmonston, 257 Mass. 12, -, 153 N.E. 99, 102 (1926).
See Comment, Recent Developments Concerning Employee Covenants Not To Compete: 4 Quiet
"Corbinization" of Massachusetts Law, 12 NEw ENG. L. REv. 647, 674-78 (1977).
76. Bess v. Bothman, - Minn. -, 257 N.W.2d 791, 794-95 (1977).
77. Redd Pest Control Co. v. Heatherly, 248 Miss. 34, -, 157 So. 2d 133, 135-36 (1963).
78. R.E. Harrington, Inc. v. Frick, 428 S.W.2d 945, 951 (Mo. App. 1968). See Comment,
Covenants Not To Compete-Enforceability Under MissouriLaw, 41 Mo. L. REv. 37, 42-43 (1976).
79. Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 119 N.H. 679, -, 406 A.2d 1310, 1313-14 (1979).
New Hampshire courts may reform an overly broad restrictive covenant if the employer first
shows that it acted in good faith in the execution of the employment contract. Id at -, 406 A.2d
at 1313.
80. See generally Lovelace Clinic v. Murphy, 76 N.M. 645, 417 P.2d 450 (1966) (semble).
81. Solari Indus., Inc. v. Malady, 55 NJ. 571, -, 264 A.2d 53, 61 (1970).
82. Hansen v. Edwards, 83 Nev. 189, -, 426 P.2d 792, 794 (1967).
83. Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 45 Ohio St. 2d 21, -, 325 N.E.2d 544, 547 (1975); Note, supra
note 35.
84. See Eldridge v. Johnston, 195 Or. 379, 245 P.2d 239 (1952); Comment, Enforcement Of
Employee Noncompetiton Agreements In Oregon, 58 OR. L. IEv. 336, 338-40, 361 (1979).
85. American Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales Co., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 480 F.2d 223,227-29 (Ist
Cir. 1973).
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and Wyoming.9" Courts following the theory are not dissuaded by the
proposition that the approach permits in terrorem tactics by an em-
ployer.9' They assert the proposition that courts willing to modify
without reference to divisibility are bound by certain restraints. Partial
enforcement of even reasonable restrictions is not allowed "[w]henever
evidence of conscious overreaching, bad faith, monopolization or de-
liberate oppression is shown."92
Thus it appears that reasonable enforcement of unreasonable and
indivisible covenants is the rule in a growing majority of state
jurisdictions.
D. Regulation by Statute
In addition to the common law doctrines described above, there
are a number of statutory definitions of the extent of enforceability
of covenants not to compete. In California,93  Montana,94 North
Dakota, 95 Oklahoma,96 and South Dakota,97 statutory law declares
void every restrictive covenant which prevents a person from practicing
a lawful profession, trade, or business.
The Oklahoma statute is representative. It provides that "[e]very
contract by which any one is restrained from exercising a lawful profes-
sion, trade or business of any kind, otherwise than as provided by the
next two sections, is to that extent void."9 It follows that employee
86. Justin Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex. 1973); Newman, Restrictive Covenants
In Employment Contracts, 35 TEx. B.J. 225, 225 (1972); Note, Contracts-Covenants Not To
Compete-Unlimited Covenant Contained In Settlement Agreement Is Subject To Reformation, 52
TEx. L. REv. 1024 (1974).
87. See general Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah 608, -, 237 P.2d 823, 828 (1951)
(semble).
88. See Vermont Electric Supply Co. v. Andrus, 132 Vt. 195, -, 315 A.2d 456, 458 (1974).
89. Wood v. May, 73 Wash. 2d 307, -, 438 P.2d 587, 590-91 (1968); Note, supra note 60.
90. See Keller v. California Liquid Gas Corp., 363 F. Supp. 123, 126-27 (D. Wyo. 1973)
(semble).
91. Insurance Center, Inc. v. Taylor, 94 Idaho 896, -, 499 P.2d 1252, 1255 (1972). See Knif-
fin, Employee Noncompetition Covenants: The Perils Of Performing Unique Services, 10 RUT.-
CAM. L.J. 25, 56 (1978); Krendl & Krendl, supra note 66, at 517-18.
92. Insurance Center, Inc. v. Taylor, 94 Idaho 896, -, 499 P.2d 1252, 1255 (1972).
93. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600-16602 (West 1964).
94. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 13-807 to -809 (1967).
95. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1975).
96. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 217-219 (1971).
97. S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 53-9-8 to -11 (1967). The South Dakota statutes, however,
provide an exception for employees engaged in a licensed profession. An agreement not to com-
pete for ten years, with a geographical limitation of twenty-five miles from the employer's princi-
pal place of business, is enforceable. Id at § 53-9-11.
98. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 217 (1971). The exceptions provided by §§ 218 and 219 of the
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noncompetition restraints are, for the most part, void and unenforce-
able.99 The Oklahoma Supreme Court, however, carved out an excep-
tion in Taturn v. Colonial Life andAccident Insurance Co. ofAmerica °°
when it validated a covenant preventing a former Colonial insurance
agent from soliciting known clients of his former employer for two
years. The court reasoned that such a "hands off" provision was not
overly restrictive and thus did not violate the statute or public policy101
A similar statute exists in Louisiana, where restrictive covenants
between employer and employees are void unless the restraint is for no
more than two years and is justified due to the expense incurred by the
employer in training the employee. 0 2 Wisconsin 0 3 and Michigan' 4
statutes also forbid noncompetition restraints that limit the practice of a
profession, trade, or business. Both states, however, have exceptions
for covenants in employment agreements. 05 Wisconsin declares all
employee noncompetition covenants void except those reasonably nec-
Oklahoma statutes pertain to restrictive covenants given in connection with the sale of business
goodwill and in connection with the dissolution of a partnership.
99. See, ag., Farren v. Autoviable Servs. Inc., 508 P.2d 646, 648 (Okla. 1973); Neal v. Penn-
sylvania Life Ins. Co., 480 P.2d 923, 924-25 (Okla. 1970); E.S. Miller Lab., Inc. v. Griffin, 200
Okla. 398, -, 194 P.2d 877, 878-79 (1948). The result appears to be identical in states having
similar statutes. See Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelly Corp., 62 CaL 2d 239, -, 398 P.2d 147, 149,
42 Cal. Rptr. 107, 109 (1965); Marine Forwarding & Shipping Co. v. Barone, 154 So. 2d 528, 530
(La. App. 1963); Couch v. Administrative Comm. of Difco Lab., Inc. Salaried Employees Profit
Sharing Trust, 44 Mich. App. 44, -, 205 N.W.2d 24, 26 (1972) (court discussed statute's applica-
bility to employer's attempted forfeiture of former employee's interest in profit sharing plan).
100. 465 P.2d 448 (Okla. 1970).
101. Id at 452. Compare the restrictive covenant in Tatum with the covenant in Neal v. Penn-
sylvania life Ins. Co., 480 P.2d 923 (Okla. 1970). In Neal, the employment agreement contained
the following restraint:
After the termination of the Agreement, Supervisor [Neal] agrees for the period of one
year from the date of such termination he will not, in the territory where Supervisor
represented Company, directly or indirectly, represent or be connected with any other
health and accident or life insurance company engaged in business competitive to that of
the Company.
Id at 924. The court, in declaring the restriction invalid, explained that such a contract restrained
Neal from pursuing a lawful profession and therefore violated statutory law. Id
In Tatum, however, the noncompetition covenant restricted Tatum for two years from con-
tacting persons insured under health or accident policies issued by his former employer and induc-
ing them to cancel, lapse, or fail to renew their insurance policies. In the majority opinion, Justice
Lavender reasoned that the contractual provision was neither expressly prohibited nor was it con-
trary to the policy of the law. Therefore the covenant was enforced. 465 P.2d at 452. But see
Cooper v. Tanaka, 591 P.2d 1181, 1183 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978) (construing OKLA. STAT. tit. 15,
§ 217 as declaring illegal only those contracts that unreasonably restrain trade).
102. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (West 1964). See Nalco Chemical Co. v. Hall, 237 F.
Supp. 678, 681 (E.D. La. 1965), af'd, 347 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1965); Comment, Agreements Not To
Compete, 33 LA. L. REv. 94 (1972).
103. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (West 1974).
104. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.761, .766 (1967).
105. See WTs. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (West 1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.766 (1967).
13
Fisher: Post Employment Restraints: An Analysis of Theories of Enforcemen
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1981
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
essary to protect the employer, and further abolishes partial enforce-
ment if the contract contains unreasonable limitations. 16 The
Michigan statutory exception enforces covenants only when the em-
ployee is given a customer list and the restriction is limited to a maxi-
mum of ninety days."7
III. COVENANTS OF CONFIDENTIALITY
In certain situations, the employer is much more concerned about
the possibility of a former employee using or disclosing information
about the employer's credit practices, financial arrangements, custpmer
lists, etc., than he is concerned about an employee going to work for a
competitor. Under these circumstances, the employer's welfare is bet-
ter served by a proviso requiring the employee to refrain from using or
disclosing any such information that he or she learned as a conse-
quence of or through his or her employment. Such non-disclosure
agreements may be difficult to enforce, however. The possibility of a
court declaring a covenant void, as seen above, 108 freeing an individual
to compete with his or her former employer, and leaving the former
employer entirely unprotected, is a very real one indeed.
Admittedly, the mere fact that an employer has deemed certain
information "confidential" is not sufficient to justify enforcement of a
confidentiality covenant. The employer must prove that the use or dis-
closure of such information by a former employee or competitor would
subject his business to unfair injury. 1"o This requires proving that the
information gives the employer an advantage over competitors. Simply
claiming that certain information constitutes trade secrets will not nec-
essarily dictate the court's determination. 10
In order to merit protection, business information must be unique
and not readily obtainable from external sources, such as public
106. Krendl & Krendl, supra note 66, at 522 (discussing the Wisconsin statute); see note 28
supra.
107. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.766 (1967). For a detailed look at Michigan's statutory
approach to unreasonable covenants, see Alterman, Trade Regulation In Michigan. Covenants Not
To Compete, 23 WAYNE L. REv. 275 (1977).
108. See notes 20-31 supra and accompanying text.
109. For a discussion of confidential information as a basis for enforcing a covenant not to
compete, see Blake, EmployeeAgreements Not To Compete, 73 HARv. L. REv. 625, 667-74 (1960);
Krendl & Krendl, supra note 66 at 502; Note, Partial Enforcement Of Post-Employment Restrictive
Covenants, 15 CoLuM. .L. Soc. PROB. 181, 184 (1979); Note, Employee Covenants Not To Com.
pete M ere Does Virginia Stand?, 15 U. RICH. L. REv. 105, 123-25 (1980).
110. See Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 235 N.Y. 1, -, 138 N.E. 485, 487-88 (1923);
Victor Chemical Works v. = 299 Ill. 532, -, 132 N.E. 806, 812-13 (1921).
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records or trade directories. 11 Professor Blake points out that in many
cases the most salient consideration is whether the method, technique,
or knowledge imparted to the employee is the product of considerable
investment of time, effort, or money by the former employer." 2 The
steps taken by the employer to ensure the secrecy of the information is
another factor. As Blake has noted, a well-structured program of com-
pany security procedures advising employees of the confidentiality sur-
rounding certain classes of information can be an extremely persuasive
argument for enforcement on that basis.'
l 3
The covenant of confidentiality has another attractive quality in
that it generally allows a broad restraint to protect the employer's inter-
ests. For example, in Novelty Bias Binding Co. v. Shevrin,114 a former
employee became familiar with his employer's production and market-
ing scheme. The court held that the material was confidential and
would prove beneficial to the employer's competitors. The court rea-
soned that since the rivals who would benefit from such special infor-
mation extended throughout a twenty-six state area, enforcement in
that area was justified. 1 5
IV. CONCLUSION
As seen from the above, the law is a mass of factually distinct
holdings and a jumble of seemingly irreconcilable decisions. Given the
confusing doctrine underpinning the approaches taken toward unrea-
sonable covenants not to compete, and additional problems in deter-
mining the reasonableness of the covenant on facts, circumstances, and
policy considerations, drafting a noncompetition covenant becomes a
venture laden with uncertainty." 6 Although the covenant of confiden-
tiality is no panacea,I 7 if properly drafted it can prevent a former em-
ployee from disclosing information such as the business's credit terms,
111. See Blake, supra note 109, at 671. See generally Harry Livingston, Inc. v. Macher, 30
Del Ch. 94, -, 54 A.2d 169, 173 (1947); Roy v. Bolduc, 140 Me. 103, -, 34 A.2d 479, 480-81
(1943).
112. Blake, supra note 109, at 671.
113. Id at 673-74.
114. 342 Mass. 714, 175 N.E.2d 374 (1961).
115. Id at -, 175 N.E.2d at 376-77.
116. For an excellent discussion of how to draft an effective covenant not to compete, see
Richards, Drafting And Enforcing Restrictive Covenants Not To Compete, 55 MARQ. L. REv. 241,
248-49 (1972).
117. One commentator believes that confidential information necessitates a broader restraint,
in terms of both time and space, for adequate protection. See Comment, Recent Developments
Concerning Employee Covenants Not To Compete" A Quiet "Corbinization" OfMassachusetts Law,
12 NEw ENG. L. REv. 647, 689 (1977).
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marketing procedures, and accounting practices-information that all
businessmen desire to keep from their competitors.' 18 The practitioner
would do well to include in employment agreements covenants of non-
competition and of confidentiality carefully tailored to the specific
needs of the situation.
Kevin B. Fisher
118. A representative covenant of confidentiality provides as follows:
Except as required by his duties to the Company, the Employee will never, directly or
indirectly, use, disseminate, disclose, lecture upon, or publish articles concerning any
information, disclosed to the Employee or known by the Emplbyee as a consequence of
or through his employment by the Company, not generally known in the industry in
which the Company is engaged or may become engaged, about the Company's products,
processes and services, including information relating to research, development, inven-
tions, manufacture, purchasing, accounting, engineering, merchandising, and selling.
Upon termination of his employment with the Company, all documents, records, note-
books and similar repositories of or containing such confidential information, including
copies thereof, then in the Employee's possession, whether prepared by him or others,
will be left with the Company. This secrecy agreement shall survive the termination of
the employee's employment by the Company.
The author wishes to express appreciation to Richard L. Barnes for his gracious consent in al-
lowing this covenant to be reproduced herein.
16
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 17 [1981], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol17/iss1/8
